An alternative risk assessment method, known as failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), is demonstrated on the regional water supply systems (RWSS) in Tucson, AZ, USA that combines delivery of potable and reclaimed water and conveyance of wastewater to a developing area within the Tucson RWSS. The goal of FMECA is to examine the volumetric severity of a component failure on the overall system function by modeling the system under alternative failure modes. Within FMECA, the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is applied to compare the risk criticality between components' failures. To complete FMECA, the Tucson RWSS is represented in a network flow model that optimally allocates flows between sources and demand points to minimize operational costs. Potential failure mode consequences are evaluated from the flow model as the volume of water not delivered to users if the component is unavailable. The volumetric severity of the failure event is converted to an ordinal value using stakeholder judgment. Likelihood of each failure mode is similarly defined by stakeholders on a 1-10 scale. The RPN is then computed as the product of the severity and likelihood. RPN values for all failure modes are then ranked to assess the most critical elements. Alternative system configurations are examined to assess the value of redundancies on the Tucson RWSS resilience.
INTRODUCTION
Engineers and decision-makers apply risk management techniques to identify potential failure modes (events) and expose potential losses. Results from these studies allow decision-makers to rank and prioritize the potential failure conditions through a risk assessment. Analysis techniques include failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA), Fault Tree Analysis, Goals Means Task Analysis, and Markov analysis methods (Fredriksen et al. ) . However, these methodologies have had limited water resources applications and no risk management methods with the exception of FMECA (Marlow et al. ) have been applied to RWSS.
The objective of this study is to provide a structured and practical method for conducting risk management for RWSSs. Of particular interest here is failure of large system components with very low and, often undefined, probabilities of occurrence. To better inform decision-makers on potential resilience vulnerabilities, a stepwise risk management technique known as FMECA can be performed to categorize risks and their consequences. The methodology is applied to a portion of the Tucson, AZ, USA RWSS that is being expanded to meet future growth. Weaknesses and critical risks can be identified early in the design process when modifications and corrective actions are still possible. The secondary objective is to investigate the resilience of different Tucson RWSS configurations: (1) centralized and decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse system, and (2) use the Central Well Field (CWF) as a backup potable source.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The definition of resilience has been tailored to specific fields/ applications. Bruneau () defined resilience from the earthquake engineering perspective. Holling () and Folke () used the resilience concepts to understand the dynamics of ecological and social-ecological systems, respectively. Norris et al. () defined resilience from the community perspective. Although little effort has been placed on RWSS resilience, much work has been conducted in the water management field. For example, Wang & Blackmore () proposed an approach to quantify the resilience of water resource systems; Hagos et al. () introduced methodology for pipe leakage detection to improve water supply system (WSS) resilience; Zhuang et al. () demonstrated adaptive pump operations for enhancing the WSS resilience when pipe failure occurs; Lansey () defined and described the characteristics of resilience from a water resource perspective. Different definitions of resilience are commonly linked to the adaptive capacity of a system, resistance to disturbance, and ability to effectively recover from any disturbance.
The National Science Foundation (NSF) supported EFRI RESIN project teams (Lansey ) defined resilient infrastructures as having 'the ability to gracefully degrade and subsequently recover from a potentially catastrophic disturbance that is internal or external in origin'. Resilience is a function of the system functionality loss and the failure event duration. The loss of functionality is dependent on the redundancy and robustness of the system while the recovery time is related to the system resourcefulness that promotes the rapidity of responses (Bruneau & Reinhorn ) . Scholz et al. () distinguish between generalized resilience that deals with rare events whose probability is not known and specified resilience due to more predictable failures (e.g., pipe breaks in a water distribution system). Here, we consider generalized resilience. Risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk management are often used in an interchangeable way to describe a variety of the techniques and processes involved in the overall management of risk (Nicolosi et al. ) . Risk management implies a process of identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, or controlling the risk to an acceptable level at an acceptable cost (Rausand ) ( Figure 1 ). Risk assessment is a product or process that collects information and assigns values to risks for the purpose of informing priorities, developing or comparing courses of action, and informing decision-making (World Health Organization ; United States Department of Homeland Security Risk Steering Committee ).
Risk is usually mentioned when outcomes that result in a certain situation or event are examined in terms of losses, adverse effects, threat hazard, and negative outcomes. Risk conception contains two types of risk, pure risk and speculative risk. The former deals with only the negative impacts on systems caused by severe impact while the latter includes both the losses and the gains identified in a risk assessment (Brachinger & Weber ) . Risk assessment increasingly copes with speculative risk, but we are concerned only with the negative impact and aspect generated by component (surface water recharge facilities, water and wastewater treatment plants (WWTP), reservoirs, pump station, and a well field) failures within the Tucson RWSS. Therefore, for this study, the risk assessment is focused on prevention and mitigation of harm. Risk of event i is defined as the product of the probability of an event occurring and the expected impact of that event or The main challenges in applying FMECA are: (1) developing appropriate system representations to assess the severity of component failure; and (2), with local experts, identifying possible failure modes and representative scales for failure occurrence and severity for calculating the RPNs that are based on the deficit of water compared to the water demand.
A unique element compared to many FMECA applications is the ability to store water throughout the network that can be used as backup sources during component failures. 
METHODOLOGY

Failure definition and resilience
For this study, the resilience of the Tucson RWSS is quantified in terms of functionality and the volumetric severity of a failure event (Huizar et al. ) . Functionality is defined as the ratio of supplied water relative to the user demand or
where S t is the volume of supplied water to users during time t and D t is the volume of water desired by that user.
Severity represents the level of injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur and provides an assessment of the seriousness of a failure mode (Modes ). Volumetric severity is defined as the water volume that is desired but not supplied (X t ) during the failure period (t ft o ) divided by the total volumetric demand during the failure period (D t f ) or
where X t is the volume of water demanded (D t ) minus the volume of supplied water (S t ). Functionality is the complement of volumetric severity.
For the case shown in Figure 2 , the volumetric severity of the failure event is 0.6 and denoted by the shaded area.
Under normal conditions, system functionality equals 1 as all users are supplied adequate water. However, when a component failure occurs at t o , the functionality is reduced, here, to 0.4. In other words, only 40% of the demanded water is delivered to users. The reduced functionality can remain at the lower value until the failure is fully repaired at time t f or gradually increase as remedial measures are taken to partially repair the system. When the system is fully repaired, functionality returns to 1.
Failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA)
FMECA consists of two sequential processes: failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and criticality analysis (CA).
FMEA identifies potential failure modes and their consequences. CA then prioritizes (ranks) the failure modes according to their failure risk criticality ( Figure 3 ). CA can be conducted either quantitatively or qualitatively. Quantitative CA is employed if failure rate, failure mode, and failure effect probabilities are available to calculate criticalities using risk relationships (Equation (1)).
If failure rates are unknown, a qualitative CA such as the RPN is applied. According to Bowles (), the RPN is the product of three ordinal scale values (each ranging from 1 to 10) of severity (SS), the likelihood of failure occurrence (OS), and detectability (DT) or
Larger SS and OS values indicate a more severe consequence associated with the failure and higher failure likelihood, respectively. DT is defined as the likelihood that the failure mode will be observed, higher numerical values of DT indicate lower failure detection probabilities.
In FMECA, failure modes with higher RPNs are assumed to result in more severe and critical damage than failure modes that yield lower RPNs (Johnson & Niezgoda ) and require a rapid response.
If failures are always detected due to their impact on the system, the detectability value (DT) is equal to 1. RPNs for the potential failure modes are then calculated using the modified RPN equation
and the RPN that will vary between 1 and 100.
Computing damage/severity -flow allocation model
Volumetric severity is a function of user demands, their spatial distribution, and the RWSS infrastructure configuration. Here, a network flow model representing the RWSS is developed to compute the shortage volume. The linear programming model objective is to minimize the cost allocation (the total cost to treat and distribute flow in the system) to all sources over the planning period (Equation (6)). The network flow model can be expressed as (notation is given in Table 1) Minimize ¼ X
Subject to 
Each node i ∈ NS is associated with quantity b i that represents the net water supply or demand rate. b i is positive, negative, and zero for a supply node, demand node, and transit node, respectively. V i , i ∈ S denotes aquifer storage for node i if node i ∈ S. P i , i ∈ N denotes pumping capacity for node i and RT i represents the treatment capacity if i is a treatment plant or recharge capacity if i ∈ S. For each arc (i, j) ∈ A, Q ijt denotes the pipeline capacity, μ ij denotes the loss multiplier to account for water leakage. The decision variables q ijt denote the flow from node i through node j at time t and c ijt is the unit cost for carrying flow from node i through node j at time t.
The objective function denotes the total operational cost over the entire planning horizon (Equation (6)). Equations (7) and (8) is the volume of storage at time t and aquifer i. Equations (9) and (10) Figure 5 ).
Water demands vary each month following a demand pattern based on 2011 records ( Figure 5 ). The proportion of monthly demand to the annual demand is assumed to follow the pattern of proportional demands from 2011. Growth and demand projections are based on an ongoing regional planning study on the Tucson Active Management Area.
Wastewater returns are assumed to be a percentage of the potable use from municipal and industrial demand nodes.
Fifty-two percent of the total demand is assumed to be for potable uses with the remainder non-potable consumption. 
Tucson RWSS configuration
The Tucson RWSS is depicted as a series of nodes and arcs impacting the Santa Cruz Well Field (SCWF). The SCWF extracted water is chlorinated at the well head before being sent to MR. The Zone C interconnection point can deliver water to Zone C or to the northern portion of Zone F (Zone FN) through the Kolb Rd booster station.
Wastewater generated in the RESIN RWSS area flows through the interceptor lines (shown as black dashed lines in Figure 6 ) and delivered to either: (1) Potable water is delivered to pressures zones in a stairstepping process to serve the potable and non-potable 
RESULTS
Scenarios
The following assumptions were made in FMECA failure scenario analyses:
• RESIN RWSS operations will be determined for 41 years on a monthly time step to analyze the overall system performance (system costs) over the 41 years.
• Given the low likelihood of a failure, only one major component (recharge facilities, water/waste WWTP, pump station, reservoir, and major pipe lines) fails at a given time.
• For demonstration purposes and to assess failure conditions that would be addressed in the short term (next • Annual demands are assumed to increase almost linearly from 7.6 to 142.1 billion liters per year over the planning horizon.
• User demand patterns are time invariant ( Figure 5 ). That is, the proportion of the annual demand is the same for a given month during all years of the simulation period.
• Failures are detected instantaneously relative to the failure duration (i.e., the failure mode's detectability scale values (DS) equals 1).
Thirty-three failure modes were identified (Table 2) . For example, failure mode 1, Zone C interconnection point pump station, corresponds to a mechanical or electrical breakdown in the pump station that conveys water from the centralized system to Zone C. Note that pipe arcs are lumped representations of the transmission system rather than a single pipe line. Partial capacity losses can occur in these links, for example, 50% reduction in the Zone D reservoir/pump station transmission capacity (failure mode 26).
To ensure that failures are not anticipated in the operation, the optimal allocations are determined by executing the network flow model without failures. Storage conditions at the end of May 2030 are used as the starting condition for each failure scenario that is evaluated through 2050. Failure severity is then computed as the volume of unmet demand relative to the total system demand after 2030.
To satisfy demands during failure conditions, dummy sources are connected to each demand node. Costs for flow on these arcs are substantially higher than for water delivery through the system so they are only used during shortages. Further, the cost assigned to supply a potable user from the dummy source is ten times greater than links from the dummy source to non-potable demand nodes to ensure that potable uses have higher priority than non-potable demands.
Failure severity (SS) and occurrence scale (OS) values
were assigned according to Figure 8 and Table 3 For example, failure mode 1 has a significant volumetric severity representing the shortfall in water delivery. For this case, the operation during the failure mode reduces total operation cost by $0.541M compared to the system with no failures. In other cases, the system cost increases due to failures, including when the volumetric severity is zero (e.g., failure modes 9 to 16 and 30) as water is delivered but through more expensive paths. 
FMECA results
RWSS MODIFICATION
The RPN values can help managers target infrastructure investments that reduce the volumetric severity or failure likelihoods. To reduce RPN values two alternative modifications were posed here: (1) decentralized wastewater treatment system and reuse system; and (2) a backup potable water supply source from the CWF. FMECAs were completed for the modified systems considering failure modes 1, 2, 3, 18, and 19 in Tables 2 and 4 . These failure modes had the highest potable users' RPNs in the initial FMECA.
Decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse system
Centralized facilities are the primary wastewater and reuse system structure in the Tucson RWSS. This configuration benefits from the economies of scale of constructing a single WWTP facility. However, as water scarcity becomes an increasing concern, centralized systems may not be the most appropriate structure from a sustainable water resources management perspective (Gikas & Tchobanoglous ) .
Decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse systems are more expensive to construct than centralized systems. However, they can have operational benefits. For example, Woods et al. () examined the economic and environmental benefits of decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse. They determined that a decentralized configuration was less costly from a total cost perspective and it produced less greenhouse gas emissions than a centralized system.
Here, we examine the impact of additional operation of decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse systems on FMECA results ( Scenarios are defined in Figure 10 . Centralized RWSS results for scenarios A1, A8, A15, A22, and A29 are taken from Alternative backup water sourcemaintaining the central well field
For many years Tucson's primary water resource was the aquifer directly below the city. Over-pumping of the so-called CWF resulted in significant aquifer overdraft and subsidence issues.
The introduction of CAP water from the Colorado River has allowed the aquifer to recover by largely eliminating routine pumping. However, Tucson Water sees value in maintaining and periodically exercising the 51CWF wells/pumps as a backup source to meet critical demand conditions. Testing the Tucson RWSS robustness and redundancy components proved necessary in two events when the pipeline from the CWR (1) ruptured, or (2) required maintenance.
To examine the benefit of such a contingency source, we modified the Tucson RWSS configuration to introduce CWF supply to the RWSS RESIN area when a failure occurs.
Costs to lift CWF water from the aquifer to the well head ($32.5/ML) were included in the model to reflect the CWF water delivery costs. The CWF can deliver water to either the Zone C interconnection point or Zone FN (Figure 11 ).
Ten failure scenarios ( Figure 12 ) were evaluated assuming that the CWF was available with results listed in Table 6 .
Demonstrating the value of investing in the backup system, all RWSS RESIN area demands are satisfied if the In the Tucson RWSS application, 33 catastrophic and critical failure modes and an occurrence scale were identified. To determine failure consequences, an optimal network flow model was formulated to determine flow allocations that minimize the operational cost. The model was solved for each failure mode and the demand shortfall was Failure modes are given in Figure 12 . Odd and even failure modes correspond to system with and without CWF. 'Without CWF' RPN values are taken from Table 4. converted to the severity scale values using a jointly developed relationship. Analogous to a risk calculation, the RPN is calculated as the product of severity and the occurrence likelihood. RPNs were ranked to identify the most critical RWSS elements for potable and non-potable users.
For the potable supply system, the pump station at the Zone C interconnection point was the most critical component since it conveys the majority of flow to the upper pressure zones. For delivery of non-potable water, the two recharge facilities were the most critical components. To improve the Tucson RWSS resilience, two modifications were examined: (1) locating a decentralized wastewater treatment and reuse system within the RESIN RWSS area reduced the RPN for all cases and often eliminated all deficits; and (2) by serving as a backup potable water supply, the CWF was completely effective in satisfying demands during failure of centralized system components such as water/WWTPs, recharge facilities, and a well field.
However, the CWF did not maintain the Tucson RWSS functionality when failure occurs within the RESIN RWSS area since the CWF conveys water only through Zone C interconnection point and Zone FN. Therefore, to overcome this weakness, additional transmission lines to the RESIN RWSS area could be added to Zone D or Zone E potable water reservoirs.
The resilience benefit of maintaining the CWF is clear but FMECA does not consider its costs. Future research should be incorporated in a FMECA taking into account a decision-making framework that provides tradeoffs between cost and resilience. To identify multiple failures and quantify the results, the proposed FMECA should be in conjunction with fault-tree analysis. Furthermore, in this next demonstration setting, the failure timing, demand (as a function of population growth and water use), and supplies are assumed to be certain. Monte Carlo analysis that considers those parameters as uncertain is seen as a useful next research step.
